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Abstract
The value of waiting to take a precaution must be considered to set the
due care level. This article presents a model to investigate the incentives
of a potential injurer to take precautions, first under a negligence rule that
takes into account the value of waiting, and then under a negligence rule
that does not. Under the first rule, the incentives are socially optimal, while
under the second this is not always the case.
1. INTRODUCTION
A precaution taken today may kill the option of not taking it later. For example,
by installing a smoke scrubber this year, a firm may give up the option of not
installing it next year if, based on new information available next year, this is then
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the best thing to do. And the loss of the value of that option is an implicit cost
that should be taken into account to set the due care level. In other words, the
value of waiting to take a precaution must be considered to determine if someone
is negligent.
In this article, I present a two-period model to investigate the incentives of a
potential injurer to take precautions, first under a negligence rule that takes into
account the value of waiting, and then under a negligence rule that does not.
Under a negligence rule that takes into account the value of waiting to set the
required level of precaution, the potential injurer will choose the socially optimal
level of precaution in both periods. This result holds if the potential injurer is
liable only for the harm caused by his negligence, but also if, when he is negligent,
he is liable for any harm that arises, including the harm that would have happened
even if he had not been negligent.
Under a negligence rule that does not take into account the value of waiting
to set the required level of precaution, the potential injurer will also choose the
socially optimal level of precaution in both periods provided, however, that he is
liable only for the harm caused by his negligence. If, when he is negligent, he is
liable for any harm that arises, he may be encouraged to take too much precautions
in the first and in the second period.
It is worth mentioning that the occurrence of an accident may also kill an
option (see especially Arrow and Fisher 1974, and Henry 1974). If this is the case,
the value of that option should of course also be taken into account to set the
required level of precaution1. But in order to focus on the lost option value of the
precaution, it will be assumed throughout this article that this is not the case. For
1I thank ... for drawing my attention to the importance of that point.
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the same reason, it will also be assumed that the precaution cannot create options,
and that the expected harm in the second period, conditional on the occurrence
of an accident in the second period, is the same whether or not an accident occurs
in the first period.
This article follows a large literature extending the standard (one-period) model
of tort law (Brown 1973 ; for a review of this literature, see Shavell 2007). The arti-
cle most closely related to mine is Shavell (2008), which also presents a two-period
model to investigate the incentives to take precautions under different regimes of
liability. But Shavell’s article focuses on the best way to set the required level of
care in the second period, once the uncertainty has disappeared. Here, the empha-
sis is on the way to set the required level of precaution in the first period. Grady
(1983) and Kahan (1989) emphasize the distinction between a liability regime in
which a negligent party is liable only for the harm caused by his negligence and a
liability regime in which he is liable for any harm that arises, but they focus on
one-period models and therefore do not consider the distinction between a liability
regime in which the value of waiting to take a precaution is taken into account and
a liability regime in which it is not the case. My article also draws on the literature
on investment under uncertainty (see especially Dixit and Pindyck 1994), and is
related to the literature on the value of waiting in lawmaking (see Parisi, Fon, and
Ghei, 2004, and Parisi and Ghei, 2005). To the best of my knowledge, however,
none of the papers in this literature examines the incentives given by the different
regimes of liability analyzed here.
After an illustration of the results with an example, the article presents a formal
analysis of the different liability regimes and ends with a conclusion.
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2. AN EXAMPLE
2.1. The Assumptions
There are two periods. At the beginning of period 1, a potential injurer can spend
$80 for a smoke scrubber that lowers the probability of harm in both periods from
30 percent to 20 percent. At the beginning of period 1, it is known that if an
accident occurs in period 1, the harm amounts to $100, but there is uncertainty
about the harm in period 2, which could amount to $1300 or $500, with equal
probability. The expected harm in period 2, conditional on the occurrence of an
accident, therefore amounts to 50 percent x $1300 + 50 percent x $500 = $900.
At the beginning of period 2, it is known whether the conditional harm amounts
to $1300 or $500. If the smoke scrubber has not been installed in period 1, the
potential injurer may decide at the beginning of period 2 to spend $80 to install
the smoke scrubber. If the smoke scrubber has been installed in period 1, there
is no decision to make in period 2. The parties are risk-neutral and the discount
rate can be ignored.
2.2. The Socially Optimal Behavior
We assume that the social goal is to minimize the expected social costs. Consider
first the socially optimal choice at the beginning of period 2 if the potential injurer
has not installed the smoke scrubber in period 1. If the potential harm amounts
to $1300, the potential injurer should install the smoke scrubber because it costs
$80 and reduces the expected harm by (30 percent - 20 percent) x $1300 = $130.
But if the potential harm amounts to $500, the potential injurer should not install
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the smoke scrubber since it costs $80 and reduces the expected harm by only (30
percent - 20 percent) x $500 = $50.
Consider now the socially optimal choice in period 1. The smoke scrubber
should not be installed in period 1, because the cost of the smoke scrubber is
equal to $80, whereas the benefit of the smoke scrubber amounts only to (30
percent - 20 percent) x $100 + 50 percent x $80 + 50 percent x (30 percent - 20
percent) x $500 = $75. Another way of seeing that the smoke scrubber should not
be installed in period 1 is to note that if the smoke scrubber is installed in period
1, the expected social costs amount to $80 + 20 percent x $100 + 50 percent x
20 percent x $1300 + 50 percent x 20 percent x $500 = $280, whereas if it is not
installed in period 1, the expected social costs amount to 30 percent x $100 + 50
percent x ($80 + 20 percent x $1300) + 50 percent x 30 percent x $500 = $275.
2.3. The Negligence Rule that Takes into Account the Value
of Waiting
Under the negligence rule that takes into account the value of waiting, the required
level of precaution in period 1 is the socially optimal level of precaution in that
period and the required level of precaution in period 2 is the socially optimal level
of precaution in that period, assuming that the optimal level of precaution was
taken in period 1. This means that he potential injurer is not required to take the
precaution in period 1, and is required to take it in period 2 if and only if it is then
known that the harm would amount to $1300. If the potential injurer is liable only
for the harm caused by his negligence, his behavior will be socially optimal.
To see that, consider first his choice in period 2 if the smoke scrubber has not
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been installed in period 1. If the potential harm amounts to $1300, the potential
injurer will install the smoke scrubber, because he will pay $80 for the installation
and will not be liable, while if he does not install the smoke scrubber he will be
liable and the expected damages will amount to 30 percent x $1300 - 20 percent
x $1300 = $130. But if the potential harm amounts to $500, the potential injurer
will not install the smoke scrubber since he escapes all liability even if it does not
install it. And in period 1, the potential injurer will therefore not install the smoke
scrubber, for if he installs it his expected cost amounts to $80, while if he does not
install it, his expected cost amounts to 50 percent x $80 = $40.
But under the negligence rule that takes into account the value of waiting to set
the required level of precaution in period 1, the potential injurer will also choose
the socially optimal level of precaution in both periods if, when he is negligent, he
is liable for any harm that arises, including the harm that would have happened
even if he had taken due care.
Consider first his choice in period 2 if the smoke scrubber has not been installed
in period 1. If the potential harm amounts to $1300, the potential injurer will
install the smoke scrubber, because he will pay $80 for the installation and will
not be liable, while if he does not install the smoke scrubber he will be liable
and the expected damages will amount to 30 percent x $1300 = $390. And if the
potential harm amounts to $500, the potential injurer will not install the smoke
scrubber since he escapes all liability even if he does not install it. In period 1, the
potential injurer will therefore not install the smoke scrubber, for if he installs it
his expected cost amounts to $80, while if he does not install it, his expected cost
amounts to 50 percent x $80 = $40.
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2.4. The Negligence Rule that does not Take into Account
the Value of Waiting
Under the negligence rule that does not take into account the value of waiting, the
required level of precaution in period 1 is set as if it were not possible to increase
the level of precaution in period 2. The lost option value of waiting is therefore not
taken into account, which means that the required level of precaution is greater
than the socially optimal level of precaution. This means that the potential injurer
is required to install the smoke scrubber in period 1 because, if the smoke scrubber
could not be installed in period 2, the cost of the smoke scrubber would be equal
to $80, whereas the benefit of the smoke scrubber would be equal to (30 percent -
20 percent) x $100 + 50 percent x (30 percent - 20 percent) x $1300 + 50 percent
x (30 percent - 20 percent) x $500 = $100. Another way of seeing that with this
liability regime the potential injurer is not required to install the smoke scrubber in
period 1 is to note that if the smoke scrubber could not be installed in period 2, the
expected social costs if the smoke scrubber were installed in period 1 would amount
to $80 + 20 percent x $100 + 50 percent x 20 percent x $1300 + 50 percent x 20
percent x $500 = $280, whereas if the smoke scrubber were not installed in period
1, the expected social costs would amount to 30 percent x $100 + 50 percent x 30
percent x $1300 + 50 percent x 30 percent x $500 = $300. Nevertheless, assuming
that the potential injurer is liable only for the harm caused by his negligence, his
behavior will be socially optimal.
To see that, consider first his choice in period 2 if the smoke scrubber has not
been installed in period 1. If the potential harm amounts to $1300, the potential
injurer will install the smoke scrubber, because he will pay $80 for the installation
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and will not be liable, while if he does not install the smoke scrubber he will be
liable and the expected damages will amount to 30 percent x $1300 - 20 percent x
$1300 = $130. And if the potential harm amounts to $500, the potential injurer will
not install the smoke scrubber, because if he installs the smoke scrubber, he will
pay $80 for the smoke scrubber and will not be liable, while if he does not install
the smoke scrubber he will be liable (because the firm should have installed the
smoke scrubber in period 1) and the expected damages will amount to 30 percent
x $500 - 20 percent x $500 = $50. In period 1, the potential injurer will therefore
not install the smoke scrubber, for if he installs it his expected cost amounts to
$80, while if he does not install it his expected cost amounts to 30 percent x $100
- 20 percent x $100 + 50 percent x $80 + 50 percent x (30 percent x $500 - 20
percent x $500) = $75.
Finally, under a negligence rule that does not take into account the value of
waiting to set the optimal level of precaution in period 1, the potential injurer will
not always choose the socially optimal level of precaution if, when he is negligent,
he is liable for any harm that arises, including harm that would have happened
even if he had taken due care.
Consider first his choice in period 2 if the smoke scrubber has not been installed
in period 1. If the potential harm amounts to $1300, the potential injurer will
install the smoke scrubber, because he will pay $80 for the installation and will
not be liable, while if it does not install the smoke scrubber he will be liable and the
expected damages will amount to 30 percent x $1300 = $390. But if the potential
harm amounts to $500, the potential injurer will also install the smoke scrubber,
because if he installs it, he will pay $80 for the installation and will not be liable,
while if he does not install the smoke scrubber he will be liable and the expected
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damages will amount to 30 percent x $500 = $150. In period 1, the potential
injurer will therefore install the smoke scrubber, for if he installs it his expected
cost amounts to $80, while if he does not install it his expected cost amounts to
30 percent x $100 + 100 percent x $80 = $110.
But the potential injurer would act optimally with this liability regime if the
example were slightly modified. Let us assume that the example is exactly the
same, except that the smoke scrubber lowers the probability of harm in both
periods from 10 percent to zero percent rather than from 30 percent to 20 percent.
Since in both cases the smoke scrubber lowers the probability of harm by 10
percent, it is clear that, as before, the smoke scrubber should not be installed in
period 1 and should be installed in period 2 if and only if the potential harm then
amounts to $1300. In that case, assuming that the smoke scrubber has not been
installed in period 1, the potential injurer will install it in period 2 if and only if the
potential harm amounts to $1300, which is socially optimal. If the potential harm
amounts to $1300, the potential injurer will install the smoke scrubber because he
will pay $80 for the installation and will not be liable, while if he does not install
the smoke scrubber he will be liable and the expected damages will amount to 10
percent x $1300 = $130. And if the potential harm amounts to $500, the potential
injurer will not install the smoke scrubber, because if he installs it, he will pay $80
for the installation and will not be liable, while if he does not install the smoke
scrubber he will be liable and the expected damages will amount to 10 percent x
$500 = $50. In period 1, the potential injurer will therefore not install the smoke
scrubber, for if he installs it his expected cost amounts to $80, while if he does not
install it his expected cost amounts to 10 percent x $100 + 50 percent x $80 + 50
percent x 10 percent x $500 = $75.
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3. THE MODEL
3.1. The Assumptions
Consider a situation in which a potential injurer engages in a potentially harmful
activity during two periods. At the beginning of period 1, it is known that if an
accident occurs in period 1, the harm to the victim amounts to h1, but the mag-
nitude of the harm if an accident occurs in period 2 is unknown. The magnitude
of the possible harm in period 2, denoted h2, is known only at the beginning of
period 2. At the beginning of period 1, the probability density of h2 is given by
f(h2).
The potential injurer must choose the level of precaution, denoted x1, at the
beginning of period 1, and can take additional precautions, denoted x2, at the
beginning of period 2. The probability of an accident amounts to p(x1) in period
1, and to p(x1 + x2) in period 2, with p′(x) < 0, p′(x) → −∞ as x → 0, and
p′′(x) > 0. The investment in the precautions taken in period 1 is irreversible,
which means that it cannot be recovered in period 2. The parties are risk-neutral
and the discount rate can be ignored.
3.2. The Socially Optimal Behavior
We assume that the social goal is to minimize the expected social costs, and for
convenience we define x∗(h), the x that minimizes x+ p(x)h, and h∗(x), the h for
which x∗(h) = x.
Consider first the socially optimal x2 conditional on x1. If h2 ≤ h∗(x1), x1 ≥
x∗(h2), and it is therefore optimal that x2 = 0. If h2 > h∗(x1), x1 < x∗(h2), and it
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is optimal that x2 = x∗(h2)− x1.
The expected social costs as a function of x1 are then given by
S(x1) =x1 + p(x1)h1 +
∫ h∗(x1)
0
p(x1)h2f(h2)dh2
+
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2]f(h2)dh2,
(1)
where the first term on the right is the cost of the precautions in period 1, the
second term is the expected harm in period 1, the third term is the expected harm
in period 2 if h2 ≤ h∗(x1), and the fourth term is the expected harm in period 2
if h2 > h∗(x1).
The socially optimal x1, denoted x∗1, is given by the first order condition2
dS(x∗1)
dx1
= 1 + p′(x∗1)h1 + p′(x∗1)
∫ h∗(x∗1)
0
h2f(h2)dh2 −
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗1)
f(h2)dh2 = 0. (2)
3.3. The Negligence Rule that Takes into Account the Value
of Waiting
Under the negligence rule that takes into account the value of waiting to set the
required level of precaution in period 1, the due care level in period 1 is equal to
x∗1, and the due care level in period 2 is equal to x∗1 if h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1) and to x∗(h2)
if h2 > h∗(x∗1). Assuming that the potential injurer is liable only for the harm
caused by his negligence, he will choose the socially optimal x1 and the socially
2Using Leibniz’s formula and noticing that p(x∗1)h∗(x∗1)f(h∗(x∗1))h∗
′(x∗1)− [x∗(h∗(x∗1)− x∗1 +
p(x∗(h∗(x∗1))h∗(x∗1)]f(h∗(x∗1))h∗
′(x∗1) = 0.
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optimal x2.
To see that, consider first his choice of x2 conditional on x1. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1)
and x1 ≥ x∗1, he will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing
x2 = 0. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), but x1 < x∗1, and x1 < x∗(h2), he chooses x2 = x∗(h2)−x1;
the reason is that as long as x2 < x∗(h2) − x1, it is worth increasing the level
of precaution because x∗(h2) − (x1 + x2) < p(x1 + x2)h2 − p(x∗(h2))h2, but if
x2 > x
∗(h2) − x1, it is not worth increasing the level of precaution because as
long as x1 + x2 < x∗1, x1 + x2 − x∗(h2) > p(x∗(h2))h2 − p(x1 + x2)h2, and as soon
as x1 + x2 ≥ x∗1, it is not necessary to increase the level of precaution to escape
liability. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), x1 < x∗1, and x1 ≥ x∗(h2), he chooses x2 = 0, because as
long as x1+x2 < x∗1, x2 > p(x1)h2−p(x1+x2)h2, and as soon as x1+x2 ≥ x∗1, it is
not necessary to increase the level of precaution to escape liability. If h2 > h∗(x∗1),
and x1 ≤ x∗(h2), the potential injurer will choose x2 so that x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. The
potential injurer will not choose x2 > x∗(h2) − x1, for he will escape liability by
choosing x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. And he will not choose x2 < x∗(h2)−x1, for he would be
liable and his expected costs in period 2 would be x2+ p(x1+x2)h2− p(x∗(h2))h2,
which is greater than x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x1 + x∗(h2)− x1)h2 − p(x∗(h2))h2, which is
equal to x∗(h2) − x1. And if h2 > h∗(x∗1), but x1 > x∗(h2), the potential injurer
will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = 0.
Consider now the potential injurer’s choice of x1. The potential injurer will
choose x∗1 and his expected cost will be
C(x∗1) = x∗1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗1)
[x∗(h2)− x∗1]f(h2)dh2. (3)
The reason is that he will not choose x1 > x∗1, for his expected costs would be
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C(x1) = x1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2, (4)
which exceeds his expected costs if he chooses x∗1, because he would be sure to pay
x1 − x∗1 more in period 1, and would have only a chance to pay at best x1 − x∗1
less in period 2. More precisely, in period 2, he would have nothing less to pay if
h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), he would have only x∗(h2) − x∗1 less to pay if h∗(x∗1) < h2 ≤ h∗(x1),
and he would have exactly x1 − x∗1 less to pay if h2 > h∗(x1). And he will not
choose x1 < x∗1 either, for his expected costs would be
C(x1) =x1 + p(x1)h1 − p(x∗1)h1
+
∫ h∗(x1)
0
[p(x1)h2 − p(x∗1)h2]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ h∗(x∗1)
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2 − p(x∗1)h2]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2,
(5)
which is also more than his expected costs if he chooses x∗1, because x∗1 is the socially
optimal level of precaution in period 1 and he would bear the entire increase in
expected social costs due to the fact that he has taken less than x∗1 in that period.
More precisely, in period 1 his expected costs would rise by p(x1)h1−p(x∗1)h1, and
in period 2, his expected cost would rise by p(x1)h2−p(x∗1)h2 when 0 < h2 < h∗(x1),
by x∗(h2) − x1 + p(x∗(h2) − p(x∗1)h2 when h∗(x1) < h2 < h∗(x∗1), and by x∗1 − x1
when h2 > h∗(x∗1).
But under a negligence rule that takes into account the value of waiting to set
the optimal level of precaution in period 1, the potential injurer will also choose
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the socially optimal level of precaution in both periods if, when he is negligent, he
is liable for any harm that arises, including the harm that would have happened
even if he had taken due care.
To see that, consider first his choice of x2 conditional on x1. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1) and
x1 ≥ x∗1, he will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = 0.
If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), but x1 < x∗1, and x1 < x∗(h2), then either x∗1 − x1 ≤ x∗(h2)− x1 +
p(x∗(h2))h2, and he chooses x2 = x∗1 − x1, or x∗1 − x1 > x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2,
and he chooses x2 = x∗(h2) − x1. And if h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), x1 < x∗1, but x1 ≥ x∗(h2),
either x∗1−x1 ≤ p(x1)h2, and he chooses x2 = x∗1−x1, or x∗1−x1 > p(x1)h2, and he
chooses x2 = 0. If h2 > h∗(x∗1), and x1 ≤ x∗(h2), the potential injurer will choose
x2 so that x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. The potential injurer will not choose x2 > x∗(h2)−x1,
for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = x∗(h2) − x1. And he will not choose
x2 < x
∗(h2)−x1, for he would be liable and his expected costs in period 2 would be
x2+ p(x1+x2)h2, which is greater than x∗(h2)−x1+ p(x1+x∗(h2)−x1)h2, which
is greater than x∗(h2) − x1. And if h2 > h∗(x∗1), but x1 > x∗(h2), the potential
injurer chooses x2 = 0, for it is sufficient to escape liability.
Consider now the potential injurer’s choice of x1. The potential injurer will
choose x∗1 and his expected cost will be
C(x∗1) = x∗1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗1)
[x∗(h2)− x∗1]f(h2)dh2. (6)
The reason is that he will not choose x1 > x∗1 in period 1, for his expected costs
would be
C(x1) = x1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2, (7)
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which exceeds his expected costs if he chooses x∗1, because he would be sure to pay
x1 − x∗1 more in period 1, and would have only a chance to pay at best x1 − x∗1
less in period 2. More precisely, in period 2, he would have nothing less to pay if
h2 ≤ h∗(x∗1), he would have only x∗(h2) − x1 less to pay if h∗(x∗1) < h2 ≤ h∗(x1),
and he would have exactly x1 − x∗1 less to pay if h2 > h∗(x1). And he will not
choose x1 < x∗1 either, for his expected costs would be
C(x1) =x1 + p(x1)h1
+
∫ h∗(x1)
0
[min(x∗1 − x1, p(x1)h2)]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ h∗(x∗1)
h∗(x1)
[min(x∗1 − x1, x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2)]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2,
(8)
which is also more than his expected costs if he chooses x∗1, because x∗1 is the
socially optimal level of precaution in period 1 and he would bear more than the
entire increase in expected social cost due to the fact that he has taken less than
x∗1. More precisely, in period 1, the cost of the precautions would be reduced by
x∗1 − x1 and the expected damages would rise by p(x1)h1, and in period 2, his
expected cost would rise by x∗1 − x1 or p(x1)h2 when 0 < h2 < h∗(x1), by x∗1 − x1
or x∗(h2) − x1 + p(x∗(h2)) when h∗(x1) < h2 < h∗(x∗1), and by x∗1 − x1 when
h2 > h
∗(x∗1).
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3.4. The Negligence Rule that does not Take into Account
the Value of Waiting
Under the negligence rule that does not take into account the value of waiting to
set the optimal level of precaution in period 1, the required level of precaution in
period 1 is set as if it were not possible to increase the level of precaution at the
beginning of period 2, and is therefore equal to the x1 that minimizes
W (x1) = x1 + p(x1)h1 + p(x1)
∫ ∞
0
h2f(h2)dh2, (9)
where the first term on the right would be the cost of the precaution in period 1,
the second term would be the expected harm in period 1, and the third term would
be the expected harm in period 2. The required level of precaution in period 1,
denoted x∗∗1 , is given by the first order condition
dW (x∗∗1 )
dx1
= 1 + p′(x∗∗1 )h1 + p′(x∗∗1 )
∫ ∞
0
h2f(h2)dh2 = 0. (10)
The due care level in period 2 is equal to x∗∗1 if h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ) and to x∗(h2) if
h2 > h
∗(x∗∗1 ).
It is worth mentioning that x∗∗1 > x∗1, because to set x∗∗1 , the lost option value
of waiting is not taken into account. More formally, this can be seen by comparing
equation (2) and equation (10) and noting that between h∗(x1) and∞, h2 > h∗(x1),
which means that
−
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
f(h2)dh2 > p′(x1)
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
h2f(h2)dh2. (11)
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Under a negligence rule that does not take into account the value of waiting
to set the optimal level of precaution in period 1, the potential injurer will choose
the optimal level of precaution in both periods if he is liable only for the harm
caused by his negligence.
Consider first his choice of x2 conditional on x1. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ) and x1 ≥ x∗∗1 ,
he will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = 0. If
h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ), but x1 < x∗∗1 , and x1 < x∗(h2), he chooses x2 = x∗(h2) − x1;
the reason is that as long as x2 < x∗(h2) − x1, it is worth increasing the level
of precaution because x∗(h2) − (x1 + x2) < p(x1 + x2)h2 − p(x∗(h2))h2, but if
x2 > x
∗(h2)−x1, it is not worth increasing the level of precaution because as long
as x1 + x2 < x∗∗1 , (x1 + x2) − x∗(h2) > p(x∗(h2))h2 − p(x1 + x2)h2, and as soon
as x1 + x2 ≥ x∗∗1 , it is not necessary to increase the level of precaution to escape
liability. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ), x1 < x∗∗1 , and x1 ≥ x∗(h2), he chooses x2 = 0, because as
long as x1+x2 < x∗∗1, x2 > p(x1)h2−p(x1+x2)h2, and as soon as x1+x2 ≥ x∗∗1 , it is
not necessary to increase the level of precaution to escape liability. If h2 > h∗(x∗∗1 ),
and x1 ≤ x∗(h2), the potential injurer will choose x2 so that x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. The
potential injurer will not choose x2 > x∗(h2) − x1, for he will escape liability by
choosing x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. And he will not choose x2 < x∗(h2)−x1, for he would be
liable and his expected costs in period 2 would be x2+ p(x1+x2)h2− p(x∗(h2))h2,
which is greater than x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x1 + x∗(h2)− x1)h2 − p(x∗(h2))h2, which is
equal to x∗(h2) − x1. And if h2 > h∗(x∗∗1 ), but x1 > x∗(h2), the potential injurer
will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = 0.
Consider now the potential injurer’s choice of x1. If the potential injurer
chooses x1 < x∗∗1 , his expected costs will be
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C(x1) =x1 + p(x1)h1 − p(x∗∗1 )h1
+
∫ h∗(x1)
0
[p(x1)h2 − p(x∗∗1 )h2]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ h∗(x∗∗1 )
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2 − p(x∗∗1 )h2]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗∗1 )
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2,
(12)
which is minimized if he chooses x1 = x∗1. The reason is that x∗1 is socially optimal
and if he takes x1 < x∗∗1 , but x1 6= x∗1, he will bear the entire increase in social cost
due to the fact that he has not taken x∗1. More precisely, if he takes x1 < x∗1, in
period 1, the cost of the precautions would be reduced by x∗1−x1 and the expected
damages will rise by p(x1)h1 − p(x∗1)h1, and in period 2, his expected costs would
rise by the entire social cost if h2 < h∗(x∗∗1 ), because he is always liable if an
accident occurs, and by x∗1 − x1 if h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ). And if he chooses x1 > x∗1, in
period 1, the cost of the precautions would increase by x1 − x∗1 and the expected
damages would decrease by p(x∗1)h1− p(x1)h1, and in period 2, his expected costs
would decrease by the entire social cost if h2 < h∗(x∗∗1 ), because he is always liable
if an accident occurs, and by x1 − x∗1 if h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ). And if the potential injurer
chooses x1 ≥ x∗∗1 , his expected costs will amount to
C(x1) = x1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2, (13)
which is minimized if he chooses x1 = x∗∗1 , because if he chooses x1 > x∗∗1 , in period
1, he would pay x1 − x∗∗1 more, and in period 2, he would have only a chance to
pay at best x1 − x∗∗1 less. More precisely, he would have nothing less to pay if
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h2 < h
∗(x∗∗1 ), he would have x∗(h2) − x∗∗1 less to pay if h∗(x1) > h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ),
and he would have x1 − x∗∗1 less to pay if h2 ≥ h∗(x1). And the potential injurer
will not choose x∗∗1 rather than x∗1 in period 1, because he would bear the entire
increase in social cost due to the fact that he has not taken the socially optimal
level of precaution. More precisely, in period 1, the costs of the precautions will
rise by x∗∗1 − x∗1 and the expected damages will decrease by p(x∗1)h1 − p(x∗∗1 )h1,
and in period 2, his expected costs would decrease by the entire social cost if
h2 < h
∗(x∗∗1 ), and by x∗∗1 − x∗1 if h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ). The potential injurer will therefore
choose x1 = x∗1 in period 1.
Finally, under a negligence rule that does not take into account the value of
waiting to set the optimal level of precaution in period 1, the potential injurer will
not always choose the socially optimal level of precaution in both periods if, when
he is negligent, he is liable for any harm that arises, including the harm that would
have happened even if he had taken due care.
Consider first his choice of x2 conditional on x1. If h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ) and x1 ≥ x∗∗1 ,
he will not choose x2 > 0, for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = 0. If
h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ), but x1 < x∗∗1 , and x1 < x∗(h2), then either x∗∗1 − x1 ≤ x∗(h2)− x1 +
p(x∗(h2))h2, and he chooses x2 = x∗∗1 −x1, or x∗∗1 −x1 > x∗(h2)−x1+p(x∗(h2))h2,
and he chooses x2 = x∗(h2)− x1. And if h2 ≤ h∗(x∗∗1 ), x1 < x∗∗1 , but x1 ≥ x∗(h2),
either x∗∗1 −x1 ≤ p(x1)h2, and he chooses x2 = x∗∗1 −x1, or x∗∗1 −x1 > p(x1)h2, and he
chooses x2 = 0. If h2 > h∗(x∗∗1 ), and x1 ≤ x∗(h2), the potential injurer will choose
x2 so that x2 = x∗(h2)−x1. The potential injurer will not choose x2 > x∗(h2)−x1,
for he will escape liability by choosing x2 = x∗(h2) − x1. And he will not choose
x2 < x
∗(h2)−x1, for he would be liable and his expected costs in period 2 would be
x2+ p(x1+x2)h2, which is greater than x∗(h2)−x1+ p(x1+x∗(h2)−x1)h2, which
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is greater than x∗(h2) − x1. And if h2 > h∗(x∗∗1 ), but x1 > x∗(h2), the potential
injurer chooses x2 = 0, for it is sufficient to escape liability.
Consider now the potential injurer’s choice of x1. If he chooses x1 < x∗∗1 , his
expected amounts to
C(x1) =x1 + p(x1)h1
+
∫ h∗(x1)
0
[min(x∗∗1 − x1, p(x1)h2)]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ h∗(x∗∗1 )
h∗(x1)
[min(x∗∗1 − x1, x∗(h2)− x1 + p(x∗(h2))h2)]f(h2)dh2
+
∫ ∞
h∗(x∗∗1 )
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2,
(14)
which is minimized if he chooses x∗1. The reason is that x∗1 is socially optimal
and if he takes x1 < x∗∗1 , but x1 6= x∗1, he will bear at least the entire increase in
social cost due to the fact that he has not taken x∗1. More precisely, if he takes
x1 < x
∗
1, in period 1, the cost of the precautions would be reduced by x∗1 − x1
and the expected damages would rise by p(x1)h1 − p(x∗1)h1, and in period 2, his
expected cost would rise either by x∗1−x1 or by at least the entire increase in social
costs when h2 < h∗(x∗∗1 ), and by x∗1 − x1 when h2 > h∗(x∗∗1 ). And if he chooses
x1 > x
∗
1, in period 1, the cost of the precautions would increase by x1 − x∗1 and
the expected damages would decrease by p(x∗1)h1 − p(x1)h1, and in period 2, his
expected costs would decrease by either x1 − x∗1 or by at most the entire social
cost if h2 < h∗(x∗∗1 ), and by x1 − x∗1 if h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ). And if he chooses x1 ≥ x∗∗1 ,
his expected cost amounts to
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C(x1) = x1 +
∫ ∞
h∗(x1)
[x∗(h2)− x1]f(h2)dh2, (15)
which is minimized if he chooses x1 = x∗∗1 , because if he chooses x1 > x∗∗1 , in period
1, he would pay x1 − x∗∗1 more, and in period 2, he would have only a chance to
pay at best x1 − x∗∗1 less. More precisely, he would have nothing less to pay if
h2 < h
∗(x∗∗1 ), he would have x∗(h2)− x∗∗1 less to pay if h∗(x1) > h2 ≥ h∗(x∗∗1 ), and
he would have x1 − x∗∗1 less to pay if h2 ≥ h∗(x1).
But if the potential injurer chooses x∗∗1 rather than x∗1 in period 1, his expected
cost will not necessarily be greater. If p(x∗∗1 ) is sufficiently close to zero, than
p(x∗∗1 )h1 and p(x∗∗1 )h2 are negligible, and it does not matter that, when he is
negligent, the potential injurer is liable for any harm that arises, including the
harm that would have happened even if he had taken due care (because the harm
that would have happened if he had taken due car would be approximately zero).
In that case, the potential injurer will take x∗1. But if p(x∗∗1 ) is sufficiently close
to one, the potential injurer will choose x∗∗1 . The reason is that if he chose x∗1 in
period 1, he would choose to take x∗∗1 −x∗1 in period 2 if h2 < h∗(x∗∗1 ). This means
that there is no point in not already taking x∗1 in period 1, since it would reduce
the expected damages in that period.
4. CONCLUSION
When there is uncertainty, it may be socially optimal to wait to take a precaution.
The main point of this article is that the value of waiting to take a precaution
should be taken into account to set the required level of precaution. If it is not the
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case, a potential injurer will act optimally if he is liable only for the harm caused
by his negligence. But, if he is liable for any harm that arises, including the harm
that would have happened even if he had taken due care, he might be encouraged
to take too much precaution. This result was demonstrated in a simple two-period
model, but the value of waiting to take a precaution must of course be taken into
account each time a required level precaution must be set.
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